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Abstract
From the early twentieth century, many Australian farm products have had their prices set by
some form of intervention, often administered by a statutory marketing board. Wool was
different: intervention, other than war-related exigencies, came much later and in a different
mechanism, a reserve price scheme (hereafter RPS). The RPS that operated from 1970 until
its collapse in 1991 has been roundly criticised. Four key elements explain the belated
emergence and particular form of price controls: the specific characteristics of wool ̶ its
importance to the economy, its export orientation, and its non-perishability; the shifting locus
of economic and political power in favour of small farmers; the declining influence of the
wool selling brokers’ and their associations; and the rise of statutory bodies and their capture
by key figures supporting increased government participation.

Introduction
From the early twentieth century, the price of many Australian farm products was set by
some form of intervention, usually a statutory marketing board.2 Volatile commodity prices
impacted heavily on the growing class of small farmer who had fewer resources to fall back
on than their colonial forebears and who faced unstable cycles of boom, bust and wartime
imperatives. Wool was different, however - centralised control came much later and took a
1
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distinctive form with the introduction of a partial reserve price scheme in 1967 before one
covering the entire clip in 1970. Apart from two episodes of war related intervention, the
price of wool before this time reflected the intersection of the demand of the buyers and the
supply of wool on offer at public auctions around Australia.
In this paper, we seek to explain why intervention in wool markets in twentieth-century
Australia was different in form and timing from other commodity trades. Our analysis brings
together some of the distinctive aspects of the economy of Australian wool with the changing
face of its politics. Policy choices reflected, in part, wool’s special place in the national
economy through its role as the leading export, with no significant home market, and in its
domination of the international raw apparel wool trade. Its heterogeneity as a product
provided support for the persistence of broker-led auction sales and contributed to the
political fault-lines that divided the wool industry lobby for decades. Its non-perishability
kept alive the idea of a reserve price scheme.
In the following section of this paper we narrate the timeline of attempts to introduce central
control of wool trading over half a century. The distinctive properties of wool and their
influence on policy outcomes is explained in the subsequent section. The shifting locus of
economic and political power in the industry in favour of small farmers at the expense of the
more conservative graziers and the declining influence of the wool selling brokers’
associations is then analysed. The exploitation of the rise of statutory bodies regulating the
industry by several influential supporters of intervention provides the final chapter of the
adoption of the RPS.

1. The long history of attempts to control the market for wool
Wool auctions developed around Australia in the last few decades of the nineteenth century
replacing consignment to the London markets. At each of the major export cities – Sydney,
Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth – local woolbrokers jointly operated an open
cry auction to dispose of most of Australia’s massive wool crop, a system whose efficiency
would be commended by overseas experts.3 It operated continuously to 1970 except for
centrally administered schemes brought about by the exceptional conditions of two world
wars and their aftermaths (Table 1).
3
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Control of a supply of wool was a strategic imperative for the British government to clothe its
troops and deny access to its enemies. Australian clips from 1916-1920 and 1939-1946 were
acquired by Britain at prices that exceeded those prevailing in previous years. A number of
other commodities ̶ wheat, meat, dairy products, sugar, eggs, fruits and metals ̶ were
subject to similar arrangements in both wars.4
During the compulsory purchases, auctions were replaced by a system of appraisal whereby
wool arriving into store was sorted into over 800 types or ‘limitations’ of wool whose value
was set with reference to achieving an average price of 15.5d per pound for the whole clip.
Better quality wool received higher than average prices while lower quality wool received
less. A similar procedure was followed in World War II when the average price was 13.4d
per pound from 1939 to May 1942, then increased to 15.5d per pound.5
Shortages of shipping space during both conflicts meant that most of the wool acquired by
the British government remained in Australia. This overhang of supply threatened to depress
the price of the new season’s wool that was no longer subject to acquisition. On 31 July 1921
the stock of carryover Australian wool stood at 1.489m bales, which was in addition to the
expected new wool coming onto the market during the 1921-22 season of 1.85m bales.6
Addressing this problem brought about the next stage of intervention, an orderly disposal of
large quantities of wool onto the market after the end of each war under the auspices of a
multi-national selling organisation. Outstanding stocks of Australian wool owned by the
British and Australian governments of 1.8m and 9.6m bales had been sold by 1924 and 1952,
respectively.7
Various attempts to introduce a peacetime scheme were all unsuccessful but provoked
contested and sometimes bitter debate within the wool trade about whether intervention in the
marketing of wool was either desirable or feasible. The war-related interventions, while
exceptional, were widely believed to have been a success, and served as a model of what
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might be achieved and the type of administrative framework required.8 The main steps in the
process are shown in Table 2. The neatness of the table masks a messier litany of proposals
and counter proposals emanating from the conferences of the wool growers associations and
in state and federal parliaments, most of which were reported in the columns of the rural and
metropolitan press.
Discussions about intervention were initiated by the overhang of stocks arising from the
Imperial Purchase of wool during World War I and the operations of British Australian Wool
Realisation Association (BAWRA), the body appointed to achieve an orderly disposal of the
postwar surplus. Sir John Higgins, who had been chair of the Central Wool Council that
administered the compulsory acquisition, was the leading interwar advocate of a mechanism
to limit the supply of wool placed on the market.
Having failed in 1920 to persuade the growers and brokers of a plan to agree jointly on the
volume of wool offered each season, he offered a more comprehensive and permanent
scheme in 1922. Wool not reaching the minimum reserve price would be acquired by the
‘central organization’, BAWRA, to be re-offered when prices had returned to higher levels.
In the face of fierce opposition from the conservative graziers and the brokers, the motion
was defeated by a vote of its shareholders to wind up BAWRA’s business.
In the wake of a calamitous fall in wool prices during the depression and the economic
distress facing many growers, a committee of inquiry in 1932 recommended the introduction
of a minimum price which was to be enforced through the application of a prohibition of the
export of any wool sold at below that price. The plan was again rejected but the parameters of
the debate had shifted. The government became increasingly engaged in the wool trade,
setting up the Australian Wool Board (AWB Mark 1, 1936-53) in 1936 and participating in
the International Wool Secretariat from 1937.9
The United Kingdom-Dominion Wool Disposals Ltd (‘Joint Organization’) was appointed to
dispose of the much larger supply overhang following World War II. It completed its task of
selling the stocks by 1952. Once again, arguments were presented to continue with an
administrative scheme but the growers rejected the proposal by a decisive margin in August
8
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1951.10 Following another sharp decline in wool prices through the second half of the 1950s,
the Commonwealth government instituted a Wool Marketing Committee of Enquiry, which
reported its findings in 1962. Arising from this was another proposal for an RPS. This time it
was rejected only narrowly by the growers in December 1965.
However, this was not the end of the matter. The AWB released a Report in October 1967
whose terms of reference now included ‘specific investigations of a reserve price scheme,
acquisition schemes, central appraisement and private selling’.11 The core proposals centred
on lifting the returns to those small growers who sold less than four bales through the
elimination of star lots, and by having their wool bulk classed and inter-lotted.12 To offset the
delay of income resulting from these processes, growers would receive an ‘average’ price. A
new Wool Marketing Authority would oversee this process whose powers included
‘instruct[ing] brokers to withhold or withdraw lots within the averaging scheme from sale
when ruling prices were at “unreasonably low levels.”’ These lots would be released when
price levels improved and, if not sold within the original price averaging period, would be
bought by the authority at the ‘state average price for that type’.13 A RPS covering around 40
per cent of the Australian clip had thus been introduced.14 A RPS covering all wool finally
came into being in 1970 through new legislation creating the Australian Wool Commission
rather than through a further plebiscite of growers.15

2. Why the political economy of wool was different
The pattern of government assistance varied significantly among agricultural products.
Support in the inter-war years was mostly enjoyed by those industries that tended to be less
focussed on export markets, such as dairying, fruits and eggs.16 It was easier to lift average
prices received by growers in those industries in which import duties could increase the
domestic price. Statutory marketing boards were responsible for exporting and the averaging
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of domestic and export returns to growers. A distressed wheat industry received significant
assistance in the 1930s.17 The farm industries receiving assistance post-World War II,
however, expanded to include various exports such as sugar, rice, cotton, and dried fruit.18
Wool, though, was distinct from the other commodities in ways which limited the type of
assistance that could be applied. It exported most of its output, wool was the nation’s leading
export over long periods of time, and it dominated the international wool trade.19 It was not
possible for wool producers to increase their total receipts significantly by forcing local
woollen mills to pay above the export price for wool.20 Few avenues were open to the wool
industry to ‘tax’ local consumers. Import duties, therefore, would provide no benefit to the
industry. While subsidies were possible, it made more fiscal sense to shift the burden to
foreign buyers through an export tax, or, given the relatively low elasticity of demand, some
form of price manipulation.
A RPS was more feasible for wool than nearly every other commodity. Its non-perishability
enabled it to be stored for long periods as part of the manipulation of supply that the scheme
would require. By contrast, the wheat acquired by the British government during World War
I had suffered considerable damage and spoilage during storage.21 Moreover, wool was the
only commodity for which there existed a large supply of storage capacity. The selling
brokers had capacious warehouses and additional capacity was found by the Central Wool
Committee during World War I as stocks grew. Their administration of the functions
previously performed by the brokers ̶ transportation, storage, appraisal of the value of each
bale, and payment of the growers − as well as the operations of BAWRA in managing the
sale of the stored wool, gave promise that the administrative machinery for a RPS was
already in place.22 Australia’s leading role in the international wool trade and the relative
inelasticity of supply additionally meant that holding buffer stocks and raising prices above
market levels would not merely push market share to other producers.
17
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Whether governments would be prepared to assist wool growers can be analysed through the
lens of both public and private interest. The public interest argument derives from wool’s
critical importance to the economy, a situation captured in the phrase, ‘Australia rode on the
sheep’s back’.23 Wool was Australia’s leading export from the late nineteenth century until
the 1970s.24 Its importance as an export was strengthened by the heavy external debt owed by
Australian governments before World War II.25 The link between wool exports and the trade
cycle weakened in the 25 years after World War II.26 However, its contribution to export
earnings was central to the success of the federal government’s management of the economy
even as the structure of the economy moved towards manufacturing.27
The relevance of the wool industry to national prosperity and national solvency gave it
special claims from a public interest point of view. Would the government stand by if the
price of wool fell below its supply cost, and what was needed to pay growers to stay in
business? The Commonwealth Wool Committee Enquiry study of the costs of production in
1932 found that the ‘average’ wool grower was not covering his working costs at the
prevailing price of wool, and could not service his debts. The Report stated that ‘if the
industry is to thrive, the grower must receive an adequate return for a reasonable capital
investment and be remunerated for his managerial services’.28
If the price of wool had fallen further than its trough of 8d per pound in 1931 and recovered
more slowly in the 1930s, what might have happened? The decline in the price of wheat in
the Depression exacerbated by the ill-fated ‘Grow more wheat campaign’ increased political
pressure for comprehensive intervention in the wheat industry. During the 1930s the federal
government paid £14.3m in bounties and relief payment and another £12m in debt
adjustment.29 In 1948 the temporary Australian Wheat Board became permanent.30 Allowing
the wool industry to fail would have been politically difficult as some of the wealthiest
23
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people in Australia were the powerful ‘squatters’ who farmed great estates. If wool was too
big to save through the public purse, though, governments may have hoped that the growers
would find a solution to save themselves. The politicians, like the wool growers, were
oblivious to the risks embedded in the proposed model, a RPS, despite a chorus of
disapproval from the emerging profession of agricultural economics from the 1960s.
While the lens of public interest suggests the likelihood of strong support for wool producers,
the private interest was more problematic. Producers co-operate through political markets to
extract rents from consumers forced to pay higher prices. Farm price volatility has
encouraged governments to exchange ‘transfers’ for political support despite evidence from
economists of the inefficiencies this has created.31 The private interest theory of regulation
suggests that it was rational for the farmers of particular commodities to devote resources to
persuading governments to meet their demands as the benefits accrued to them, while the per
capita costs of the ‘rents’ were comparatively low when dissipated across all consumers.32
Given that the ‘consumers’ of wool were largely foreign buyers with limited constituency, the
political case for intervention becomes more persuasive. Some groups, however, are better
placed than others to extract rents.33 Another important feature of the wool industry – its
heterogeneity – detracted from the ability of producers to extract policy rents.34
Heterogeneity derived from the nature of wool itself and the many contexts in which it was
produced in twentieth-century Australia. Australia’s sheep population was overwhelmingly
merino with a minority of cross-breed types. Within those broad categories, there were
numerous sub-breeds that were pastured across widely differing climatic regions. Farming
practices also varied among producers, affecting the qualities of the wool produced. There
was further heterogeneity within the wool clip by parts of the fleece that classers distributed
into bales. The land subdivision policies of the second half of the nineteenth century, the
opportunities for mixed farming brought about by refrigeration, together with returning
soldier settler schemes in the twentieth increasingly created very different classes of wool
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producers. Essentially, this was a bifurcation between the large graziers who were among the
earliest settlers and the range of smaller scale producers that emerged from these policies.
The highly heterogeneous character of wool required a very different form of marketing
system from most other commodities that were sold directly to merchants or processors such
as meat or dairy products. Only wool employed selling brokers as intermediaries between the
growers and buyers who provided a comprehensive set of marketing services. They received
wool into store, weighed and catalogued it, permitted buyers to inspect sample bales prior to
auction, and conducted the auctions. Brokers had built up great knowledge of the complex
wool trade and had invested in large warehouse facilities.35
Deep divisions existed within the wool growing community about the best form of marketing.
The large scale specialist wool growers, the ‘graziers’, favoured the auction system operating
without government intervention. Smaller scale growers, an increasing proportion of whom
also grew wheat and/or raised beef and dairy cattle, called for assistance. These different
perspectives flowed from the economic position of each group. The graziers had the
resources to await payment from the London sales and to withstand fluctuations in the
prosperity of the industry. Many had long standing relationships with brokers and stock and
station agents who provided them with lines of credit. They also benefited from paying lower
sales commissions to their agent in reflection of the economies of scale of handling larger
consignments.36 By way of contrast, the smaller scale growers had fewer resources to enable
them to ride out poor seasons and they paid relatively more per bale to the brokers. It was the
smaller and indebted growers who suffered most during the Depression.37 In contrast to the
graziers, some smaller growers harboured a grievance against the ‘middleman’ broker whose
charges for marketing services seemed exorbitant.38 Woolgrowers had a saying: ‘I shear the
sheep, and my agents shear me’.39 Any sharp fall in commodity prices fuelled calls for

35
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assistance. The risk that larger graziers would be able to buy out smaller farmers in difficult
times without support also put the two groups at loggerheads over policy.40

3. The shifting politics of the wool industry
The growing influence of small farmers
The economic bifurcation of the industry described above played out in the political context.
Wool growers were further divided in terms of ideology. The graziers’ political views had
been forged in the late nineteenth century. In the 1890s they formed political associations,
such as the overarching Pastoralists’ Federal Council, which was renamed the Graziers’
Federal Council in 1919, to defend themselves against demands from shearers, carters and
maritime unions for higher pay. An initial objective of the United Graziers’ Association of
Queensland was the right to ‘freedom of contract’.41 Liberal economic ideology in the labour
market was carried over to a ‘hands off’ attitude in the organization of product marketing. As
Australian politics was reshaped by the emergence of the Australian Labor Party in the early
twentieth century, the conservative side of politics split into an urban party of capital and,
after World War I, a Country Party to represent those in the ‘bush’.42 The graziers were
united with the urban elite and its political parties through commercial relationships, social
networks, and sectarian ties.43 Farmers found a political voice through the formation of
numerous commodity-based farm associations and the Country Party which quickly enjoyed
electoral success in many states as well as federally.44
The smaller wool growers were to win the battle for political influence. Crisp notes that soon
after 1900 ‘…farmers were soon threatening to be able to out-shout the squatters.’45 Farmers
showed a remarkable propensity to organize to protect and advance their interests.
40
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Associations grouped around commodities popped up like mushrooms within and across
states and came to forge national bodies.46 Regular improvements in infrastructure, primarily
transport provision and the growth of mass media, reduced the collective action costs for
large numbers of rural farmers.47 Growers felt that they deserved protection from volatile
prices and rapacious middlemen: the solution was cooperative marketing arrangements with
the assistance of the state.48 A willing political handmaiden was found in the Country Party
whose policies with respect to marketing reflected the wishes of producer bodies placed in
charge of statutory marketing authorities. The evolution of the various associations
representing wool growers shows that the membership of those representing the smaller
groups was significantly greater than those representing the graziers after World War II. The
decisive break came in 1939 with the establishment of a national body, the Australian Wool
and Meat Producers Federation (hereafter AWMPF), from a number of organizations which
had formed in the 1930s. By the mid-1960s, the 46,000 members of the AWMPF produced
60 per cent of Australia’s wool. By contrast, the graziers, whose national body became the
Australian Woolgrowers’ and Graziers’ Council in 1960, had less than 25,000 members.49
While the numbers and influence of the small and mixed farmers rose, the position of the
graziers in the wool industry was undergoing a slow decline. The largest woolgrowers were
in retreat. In 1919-20 flocks with more than 10,000 sheep accounted for 18 per cent of all
flocks, by 1939-45 this number had fallen to 14 per cent before collapsing to six per cent in
1960. In 1930, 30 per cent of wheat farms ran sheep. This number had risen to over 80 per
cent by 1960.50 The drought and price falls in the 1960s marked a decisive break in the
fortunes of second and third generation grazier dynasties. Alec Morrison notes ‘State and
federal government policies were stacked against them – closer settlement, land tax and death
duties were all designed to break up the big family estates, and were too successful in doing
so. Taxation laws in respect of tax on undistributed profits precluded family firms from
accumulating reserves to be held against tough times’.51
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The declining role of the wool selling brokers’ associations
The wool brokers’ associations and their member companies, the likes of Dalgety,
Goldsbrough Mort, and Australian Mercantile Land and Finance, had the most to lose from
the end of the auction system, of which they were the central coordinators, or it becoming an
adjunct to an administrative system of determining price. They campaigned vigorously to
persuade growers to vote against all the proposals for intervention. Faced with the
intervention precedent set by World War One and confronted by the growing power of the
small farmer lobby ignited by diminishing cost-price margins, they lacked the leadership and
organisational structure to see off the challenge to their traditional leadership of the wool
trade.
The National Council of Wool Selling Brokers Associations (NCWSBA) did not provide a
platform for a strong leader. This national body only came in to being at the end of World
War One, a quarter of a century after most of its constituent regional associations. It had little
authority over the local associations who conducted the auctions and with whom it was often
in disagreement.52 Infrequent meetings amongst its executive, comprised of second tier
management ranks from the big pastoral houses and separated by long distances, and the
rotation of the chairmanship between the large Anglo-British firms from Sydney and
Melbourne, created little social capital that may have forged a more cohesive group with a
clear vision of its future and purpose.
The brokers had no option but to work with the government-appointed Central Wool
Committee during and immediately following both World Wars under the appraisal system.
The quarrel concerned what would come next - whether prices should be ‘managed’ or left to
the dictates of the market according to the trade’s custom and practice. Although proposals to
create a RPS in the twenties were defeated, the role of the brokers irrevocably altered as
growers increasingly played a direct role in industry policy, no longer mediated through the
brokers. Participation in the Australian Wool Council (AWC) from 1920 gave the growers a
seat at the table. While its principal objective was to determine allocations for the coming
season, the growers used the AWC as a forum to press their claims for better terms and
conditions from the brokers for the services provided. They were no longer simply clients
but partners.
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Increasingly, the brokers felt that ‘in a lot of little ways the Growers were encroaching on our
preserves’.53 The growers broke ranks on a range of issues. For instance, they approached the
government to give the necessary authority to both research and promotion through the
creation of the AWB (Mark 1)54 and the International Wool Secretariat.55 Dalziel Kelly,
chairman of the Australian Woolgrowers’ Council, claimed that he had drafted the bill
creating the AWB (Mark 1) and had been instrumental in the formation of the International
Wool Secretariat.56 In 1931 the growers approached the government to establish an enquiry
into the wool industry which recommended that a RPS be instituted. Moreover, brokers were
offered far fewer representatives than the growers on the proposed industry body, the
Commonwealth Wool Executive. To add insult to injury, Sir Graham Waddell, acting
chairman of the AWC, had directly approached the government in October 1934 seeking a
guarantee of funding to support a floor price of £6 per bale.57 The entente cordiale was long
over.
The lack of decisive leadership and direction by the NCWSBA itself, reflecting its
decentralised structure, made matters worse. By avoiding overt contact with government
they surrendered influence to the growers. They made a fatal mistake in 1934 by refusing an
invitation from Sir Graham Waddell, chairman of AWC, to join with the growers in a
deputation to the Prime Minister. The brokers still held to the view that any involvement by
the government in the wool trade should be avoided. Sir Frank Young, President of
NCWSBA, argued that it was ‘very unfortunate that the Government has been brought into
the Wool Trade [by creating the AWB]… [there] was a danger of this developing into more
general Government control’.58 The shortcomings of the brokers and their associations were
further exposed when they attempted their own form of buffer stock control to offset intraseason price falls by limiting offerings and/or cancelling auctions, particularly in 1924-25,
1931-32, 1933-34 and 1937-38. The mixed results confirmed to growers that the brokers
could not deliver a smoothing of the price of wool. They lacked accurate information about
the wider aspects of the wool market such as production in other countries, stocks in
manufacturing countries, demand from the textile industry, or the supply of substitute fibres

53

NCWSBA, Minutes, 14th February 1938, p. 3.
Wool Publicity and Research Act, No. 24 of 1936.
55
Abbott, "Promoting wool internationally".
56
NCWSBA, Minutes, 9th June 1935, p. 389; A. Barnard, "Kelly, Sir George Dalziel (1891-1953)", Australian
Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 9, 1 (1983), pp. 555 - 6.
57
NCWSBA, Minutes, 7th December 1932, p. 245, 9th August 1934, pp. 163-65; 10th August 1934, p. 167.
58
NCWSBA, Minutes, 23rd September 1934, p. 343, 10th June 1936, p. 403.
54

13

such as cotton and, from the 1930s, synthetics and were ignorant of the idea of price
elasticises.
The brokers faced similar pressures after World War Two but were by now a much
diminished force. By the early 1950s the brokers were aware that their organization had ‘lost
[its] former prestige’ and that it was being ‘batted from pillar to post’.59 While the brokers
could communicate their views about wool marketing directly to individual growers through
their agents and by letter during the various referendum campaigns in 1951 and 1965, they
had minimal political influence. Despite the claims of Higgins and some growers that they
had operated a high cost model, brokers had struggled to maintain revenues throughout the
difficult interwar years as they faced increased competition from co-operative brokers and
strong pressure from growers to reduce fees and commissions. Regional pressure to establish
new selling centres, following their temporary World War Two expansion, threatened the
scale efficiencies of the traditional auction locations. Large value, co-ordinated investments
were required in facilities such as new warehouses outside the CBDs and in new services
such as testing houses and futures markets. All of these initiatives would have necessitated
collective investments by the brokers. Unfortunately, the structure of the wool-selling
brokers’ associations rendered such action improbable. Altering the Constitution in 1962 to
include meetings of the chief executives of the parent companies, as a Board of Principals,
was a case of too little far too late. Consolidation and diversification from the industry
amongst these companies by the 1960s inevitably diminished their interest in wool. 60

4. The rise of statutory bodies and the role of personality.
The wool trade became increasingly populated by a range of official bodies stepping into the
void left by the brokers, encouraged by growers’ representatives, and forming part of the
expanded role of government in industry and macroeconomic policy in mid twentieth-century
Australia. As the nation’s most important export industry, wool particularly attracted notice.
The AWB (1936) and participation in the International Wool Secretariat from 1937,
mentioned above, were early examples of such bodies. AWB’s functions were ‘the
improvement of the production of wool in Australia’, and ‘the increase and extension, by
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publicity and research or any other means, of the use of wool throughout the world.’ To this
end it had access to a Wool Publicity and Research Fund, which was financed by receipts of
6d per bale raised by the Wool Tax Act 1936.
Over time the resources available to the statutory bodies and the scope of their activities
continued to widen. Levies imposed on the growers gave rise to a growing stream of
revenues.61 Grower levies were increasingly augmented by government guarantees of
borrowing, capital injections and monies from consolidated revenues.62 The government also
provided capital for the Australian Wool Testing Authority which began in 1957.63 The
Australian Wool Realization Commission, the local arm of the Joint Organsiation, lived on
despite the defeat of the 1951 referendum. Some of its resources, the large stock of wool
stores accumulated during the war,64 along with the Wool Statistical Service, were transferred
to the new Australian Wool Bureau in 1953. The latter now replaced the brokers in the
estimation of the size of the clip and allocation of wool to be offered at auction.
Following the Inquiry into the wool industry in 1961, the Australian Wool Bureau was
replaced by the AWB (Mark 2) in 1963.65 The game had decisively changed as the powers of
this new authority were to encompass marketing as well as promotion. To this end, the Board
was to liaise with the newly-created Australian Wool Industry Council (AWIC) for the
purposes of introducing a reserve price scheme, and a Wool Marketing Committee was
created to prepare a plan. With the passage of the Wool Industry Act 1970 and the
introduction of the Australian Wool Commission Act 1970 the passage to a RPS was
complete.
Critical to this last phase of the adoption of an RPS for wool was that fact that its supporters,
especially the AWMPF, had the inside running as they worked within the generously
resourced statutory bodies whose policies they could influence and that provided access to
senior politicians and bureaucrats. The timing of AWMPF’s birth in 1939 was most fortuitous
as the control of wool marketing during the war and immediate post-war years provided the
AWMPF with the opportunity to entrench itself within the statutory bodies. Representatives
of the AWMPF were given places on the Central Wool Committee and on the Australian
61
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Wool Realization Commission in 1940 and 1945 respectively. Eric Hitchins, AWMPF
president, was actively involved in the conferences that led to formation of the Joint
Organization and in the discussions about the proposal to continue its operation afterwards.66
In keeping with customary practice of the relationships between producers and the Country
Party, representatives on these boards were drawn from ‘nominees of the relevant commodity
organizations’ whose resultant close links with politicians and bureaucrats gave them a
privileged position in the formation of agricultural policy.67 As Encel noted, Country Party
members or ‘farmers’ representatives are frequently able to hold ministerial portfolios which
enable them to advance the interests of farmers by direct administrative action’.68
This close nexus between producers, politicians, and public bodies had the effect of bringing
into coalition three powerful personalities from across these three sectors who, Charles
Massy has argued, played a key role in the manoeuvring of the 1960s to bring the RPS to
fruition. While the brokers languished from lack of leadership, the proponents of a reserve
price scheme were led in the post-war period by three ‘knights’: Sir William Archer (‘Bill’)
Gunn, Sir John Crawford, and Sir John (‘Black Jack’) McEwen. Gunn, from a pastoral
background and Chairman of AWB from 1958, was a ‘formidable operator, full of cunning
and political savvy’ who particularly understood the critical role of the statutory bodies. In
Massy’s view, his ‘legacy was to convert both the AWB and the IWS from statutory
appendages to interventionist vehicles’.69 Crawford was a highly respected and influential
public servant trained in agricultural economics. He was appointed as the first
Commonwealth Wool Advisor in 1950, a position that strengthened the link between the
AWB and the government, particularly as he was a senior bureaucrat with close connections
to the Cabinet. In the same year, he became Secretary of the Department of Commerce and
Agriculture, and of the reorganised Department of Trade in 1956. In 1962-4 he chaired the
Australian Wool Industry Conference. His opinions provided credibility and gravitas to the
influence of McEwen and the hustling of Gunn. McEwen, leader of the Country Party from
1958, was Crawford’s minister at Commerce then Trade, positions he held for over two
decades. McEwen’s strong belief in agricultural assistance was informed by his experiences
as a soldier settler (although successful himself) and witnessing the impact of the interwar

66

Hitchins, Tangled Skeins; Fyfe, Gentlemen’s Agreements; McCarthy, Wool Disposals.
Campbell, "Australian farm organizations", pp. 117-120.
68
Encel, Equality and Authority, p. 317.
69
Massy, Breaking the Sheep’s Back, p. 20, p. 16.
67

16

depression. He used his formidable political skills to exploit the coalition’s small majorities
and the cost-price squeeze of the 1960s in support of the reserve price scheme.

Conclusion
The wool industry has occupied a central place in modern Australian history. It created
enormous wealth for large squatters-cum-pastoralists in the nineteenth century. By the
twentieth century, profits and changes in property regimes had lured many smaller farmers
into the industry and attracted the attention of policy makers and economic thinkers aware of
its importance for long term development in Australia. Like all commodities, wool suffered
from the instability of fluctuating supply and demand; but the stabilising solution deployed
for other farm products – statutory marketing boards – was unsuited to a product of wool’s
heterogeneity. It had apparently found its own solution late in the nineteenth century – a
broker led auction system – but this was failing under the pressure of economic uncertainty
and political change.
The result was a broad-ranging fifty-year debate about the future of wool marketing in
Australia, which infused its way through the mainstream of economic and political debate by
encompassing the views of industry leaders, politicians, public servants, and economists. At
length, it produced a unique experiment for Australia – a reserve price scheme. The scheme
failed within twenty years. In this paper, we have described the long tortuous pathway to an
RPS and analysed why it ultimately produced a scheme that was unsuccessful. Throughout its
evolution, the weight of economic thinking was opposed to an RPS. However, this came up
against a political environment in mid-century that was increasingly receptive to the idea,
particularly through the growing number of small farmers, most vulnerable to market
fluctuations, with their emerging industrial representation, the AWMPF, and a political voice
that was growing louder, the Country Party. The traditional laisser-faire forces of the
industry, graziers and brokers, were sidestepped by increasing support for industry statutory
bodies after World War Two. Even then, it took a coalition of powerful personalities across
growers, politics and officialdom – Gunn, McEwen and Crawford – united in their belief in
an RPS and connected through statutory bodies and the Country Party – to drag the RPS over
the line.
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The importance of the wool industry in Australia also mattered to this outcome. Massy has
argued that the RPS’s failure lay in the choice by ‘wool industry leaders to take a political
and not a commercial path to meet competitors’. Critics of the economics of such schemes
from outside the wool trade who wrote in the 1930s were ignored.70 Little had changed from
the 1960s onwards ‘when most of the arguments advanced by the fierce participants on the
two sides had little economic substance’.71 While this is true, the willingness of politicians
and public servants to listen to the industry also derived from a belief that the massive wool
trade was too big to fail.
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Table 1. Operations of Australian Wool market 1900-1991
Date range

Method of selling

1890s-1916

Auctions

1916-20

Compulsory purchase at fixed price

1920-1924

Mix of auction of new wool and orderly disposal of surplus war wool

1925-1938

Auctions

1939-1945

Compulsory purchase at fixed price

1946-1950

Mix of auction of new wool and orderly disposal of surplus war wool

1951-1967

Auction

1967-70

Mix of RPS for small lots and auctions for the rest

1970-1991

Reserve price scheme

1992-

Auctions
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Table 2. Proposals for intervention
Date

Scheme

Result

March

Australian Wool Council.

Defeated by growers’ vote

1920

Proposed to return to auction but with the

74.9% of votes cast in favour,

power to withhold wool from sale to

required 75% for acceptance.

influence price. Growers to pay levy of
1%. To operate for one season only,
1920/21.
May 1921

Directors of BAWRA appeal to

No wool to be exported below 8d

Commonwealth government to set a

per pound, May-November 1921.

minimum export price.
August

Conference between BAWRA and

Growers agree to Plan 4 which

1922

growers.

brokers oppose.

Higgins proposes four ‘plans’. Plan 4 to
‘guarantee a minimum price’.
October

Extraordinary meeting of BAWRA.

December 1922 meeting only 15 of

1922

Higgins proposes extension of plan 4 to

800 supported.

utilise £16m of undistributed profits as
capital. Promise of lower marketing costs
through ‘central organization’.
June 1925

Higgins presents similar plan to the

No action.

Graziers’ Federal Council.
June 1931

1932

Higgins presents similar plan to Empire

Referred to committee which did

Wool Conference in Melbourne.

not meet.

Commonwealth Wool Inquiry Committee

Lobbying by conservative graziers

proposes formation of a Commonwealth

and selling brokers prevents

Wool Executive of representatives of

government action.

growers and brokers to set minimum
prices. Government to prohibit export of
wool below that price. The Executive to
‘confer with the Commonwealth
Government to secure necessary funds’.
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1951

Proposed continuance of Joint Operation,

Defeated 63,740 ‘no’ votes to

by a statutory body involving the UK

16,310 ‘yes’.

government, which withdrew, New
Zealand and South Africa. Australian
contribution of £59m through through a
grower levy of 7½% and government
guarantee to cover shortfall.

1965

Proposal for AWB to operate a RPS.

Defeated 59,235 ‘no’ votes to

Growers to contribute capital by levy,

51,386 ‘yes’ votes.

supplemented by bank loans and
government guarantee.
1967

1970

AWB introduces RPS covering lots of

No plebiscite. Statutory body has

four bales or less.

powers to act.

Australian Wool Commission introduces

No plebiscite. New statutory body

RPS and controls all aspects of the

has powers to act.

marketing of Australian wool.

Sources: Western Mail (Perth) 18 March, 1920, p. 8; The Mercury (Hobart, Tas), 30 August
1922, pp. 5-6; Fyfe, Gentlemen’s Agreements: p. 116; E. C. Dyason, “BAWRA”, , pp. 59, 66;
Higgins, Sir John (1925), Address on regulation and stabilisation of wool values to
Conference of Woolgrowers held in Melbourne 23 June 1925 (privately published); Higgins,
Sir John (1931), The stabilisation or the equalisation or the insurance of wool values, address
delivered to The Empire Wool Conference, Melbourne 22 June 1931 (privately published);
Commonwealth of Australia (1932) Report by Commonwealth Wool Inquiry Committee,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1932/34, IV, paragraphs 255-58; McCarthy, Wool
Disposals 1945-52, 129 and Appendix 5, pp. 164-72; Hitchins, Tangled Skeins, p. 169; F. E.
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